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Abstract
The model required to drive socio-economic development in Africa, and the
relationship between the state and the private sector based on that model,
have sparked much controversy among African analysts. Some question the
relevance of other successful models of development, such as in the liberal
West or in East-Asia, to the African context. Others criticise all models of
development that are “alien” to African cultures and conditions hence
rejecting the NEPAD model on this basis. This paper argues that although
NEPAD does not present a detailed model of the relationship between the
state, the private sector and civil society in Africa, some of its theoretical
underpinnings suggest a balanced framework that should prompt African
scholars to search for new models that do not necessarily imitate already
successful ones but respect the particularities of each African state.
Resumé
Le modèle requis pour tirer le développement socioéconomique en Afrique
ainsi que le lien qui existe entre l’Etat et le secteur privé, conformément à ce
modèle, ont été à l’origine d’une grande polémique au sein des analystes
Africains. D’aucuns discutent sur la pertinence, pour l’Afrique, d’adopter
des modèles de développement couronnés de succès, soit dans un contexte
56 AJIA 11: 1, 2008
libéral occidental, soit en Asie de l’Est. D’autres s’adonnent à la critique de
tous les modèles de développement ‘étrangers’ aux cultures et aux réalités
de l’Afrique et rejettent dans la même lancée le modèle préconisé par le
NEPAD. Ce document soutient que même si le NEPAD ne fait pas une
présentation détaillée du lien qui devrait exister entre l’Etat, le secteur
privé et la société civile en Afrique, quelques unes de ses explications
théoriques préconisent un cadre équilibré qui inciterait les experts Africains
à chercher à élaborer de nouveaux modèles qui n’imiteraient forcément pas
ceux déjà couronnés de succès, mais de modèles qui respecteraient plutôt
les spécificités de chacun des Etats africains
Introduction
Development strategies in Africa are biproducts of a certain historical
moment with its social, economic and political conditions as well as the
dominant or leading development thought of that moment. While the
Lagos Plan of Action was the product of a state-led and collective self-
reliance mode of development, NEPAD, coming more than twenty years
later, reflects the post-Washington consensus model of development.
The debate within the latter model is no longer about whether the state
should intervene in the development process. It is rather about the
mechanisms of such intervention and the best relationship between the
state, the private sector and civil society for achieving development.
Nevertheless Africa is still in a need of a new development model that
can provide a partnership framework between the three main development
actors.
In its own theoretical framework NEPAD seeks such a model, but
can NEPAD really provide an effective model of development in Africa?
This paper examines that broad question by posing the following more
specific research questions:
• What was the model of development aspired to by previous African
development plans? Was the relative failure of such plans related to
problems with the theory or with the implementation?
• Does NEPAD present a genuinely new model of development that
avoids the shortcomings of previous development plans? What has
NEPAD achieved in this respect in the last four years?
• To what extent can the African Peer Review Mechanism, which aims
at sharing the best development practices among African countries,
contribute to the development of these countries?
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Accordingly the first part of this paper briefly discusses the developmen-
tal role of the state in Africa since independence, the second part exam-
ines the main development initiatives in Africa prior to NEPAD and
their contribution to addressing the African development predicament,
and the third part discusses NEPAD’s perspective on the partnership
between development actors in Africa.
State and Development in Africa: The Sacred Leviathan
Different explanations have been presented to explain the African de-
velopment crisis that has prevailed since the end of the seventies. For
some the explanation is to be found in the theory of the post-colonial
state. In this view the post-independence African state retains many of
the features of the colonial state, especially the state’s dominant role in
the political and economic realms, and is characterised, as Jean Bayart
argues, by the “politics of the belly”, which refers to the networks of
clientalist relations that control the post-colonial state (Bayart 1993).
This interpretation served as a theoretical premise for structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) that aimed, as many African analysts
maintain, to undermine the role of the state and had the effect of making
the weak states of Africa even weaker, leading, as Bade Onimode (1995)
put it, to the strategic erosion of the state in Africa. For Mkandawire and
Soludo the neo-liberal theoretical premise of SAPs, which depicts the
state as the source of all evils, is simplistic. Demonising local elites and
seeing their policies as merely the result of agency do not reflect the
actual causes of the economic predicament in Africa. Besides the SAPs
did not take into consideration that the institutions needed to perform
the adjustment tasks are either weak or totally absent  (Mkadawire and
Soludo 1999). For Tade Akin undermining the role of the state has
affected its legitimacy and increased its suppressive role, leading to even
greater exclusion of some social groups (Akin 1999: 79-109), while for
Helmi Sharawi the retreat of the state has resulted in spreading
corruption, as introducing free-market economies fuels the impulse for
self-enrichment. Accordingly the institutionalisation of corruption has
replaced the rule of law (Sharawi 2001: 35-38. Thus the main criticisms
of the neo-liberal paradigm, as reflected in SAPs, identify the downplaying
of the role of the state, the underestimating of the weaknesses of African
state institutions, the social repercussions of the erosion of the role of
the state and the role of free market in promoting corruption as the key
factors that make this paradigm counter-productive. It will be important
3.Tawfik.pmd 26/02/2009, 17:4257
58 AJIA 11: 1, 2008
to keep these arguments in mind when considering the theoretical
premises of NEPAD .
In the contrary view the state is the centre of gravity around which
African development thinking should revolve despite the fact that the
current model of the state in Africa cannot serve as an engine for economic
development, since most African states fall prey to special interests that
render it an “elitist phenomenon” (Kasongo 2003: 128). On the other
hand very little has been written on the potential role of the private
sector or on the prospects of public-private partnerships (PPPs). In the
post-independence era this may have been justifiable, as state domination
ofeconomic planning and development led to a relatively weak and small
private sector. Moreover since the 1980s the highly criticised SAPs,
favoring market mechanisms at the expense of the state, have led to the
private sector being demonised by many African analysts and blamed
for key aspects of the African economic crisis. Few have been concerned
with the fact that state policies, either by not providing an encouraging
environment for investment or through reliance on clientalist networks,
have led to the flight of African private capital out of the continent.
According to James Wolfenson, the former president of the World Bank,
37 percent of the private capital of African business is invested outside
the continent compared to 3 percent in the case of Asia and 17 percent
for Latin America (Wolfenson 1998: 9).
As for the role of civil society African scholars, while admitting its
role in promoting development, have had many reservations about that
role. For Yusuf Bangura (1999) civil society in Africa is not really “civil”,
that is, it is not based on inclusive participation but on narrow interests.
Similarly much has been written on civil society’s relationship with western
donors and how this relationship affects its supposed role in promoting
“good governance”, as well as on the lack of coordination between civil
society organisations across the continent (Beckman 1993; Abdel
Rahman 2004). Little has been written on the potential development
role of civil society, especially community-based organisations (CBOs)
working at the grassroots, despite the fact that this role has increased
due to the retreat of the state from the provision of public services since
the 1980s (Chimanikire 2003).
Most alternative models of development proposed by African analysts
depend on ones that have succeeded elsewhere. As Mkandawire
(2001: 1) bluntly argues:
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most of the analyses about African states that have led to so much
despondency about prospects of development are based on invidious
comparison between African states in crisis and idealized and
tendentiously characterised states elsewhere. This invidious
comparison has occulted the African state, making concrete analysis
of its character less important than the normative statements about
what it should be. The “ought” has proved more interesting than the
“is”; turning debates on the state in Africa into the most pontifical
and teleological of any theme in Africa.
Various models have inspired analysts. For Kasongo, for example, Africa
should adopt European-style “social democracy”, a model, he argues,
that will be more compatible with the collective social nature of African
societies than the liberal capitalist model. On the other hand, following
the success of the developmental state model in East Asia, a debate
began in African development circles on how this model could be replicated
in Africa.
In these debates there are different understandings of the
developmental role of the state, especially with regard to the relation
between the state and the private sector. A developmental state, according
to Mkandawire (2001), is one whose ideology is “developmentalist”.
This kind of state conceives its mission as one of ensuring economic
development and its elite has the capacity to establish an ‘ideological
hegemony’ and implement economic policies effectively, something that
entails the autonomy of the state from social forces and private interests
(Mkandwire 2001: 2-3). Edigheji (2003) adds other elements to the
definition: the promotion by the state of market-enhancing rather than
market-repressing economic policies and a clear division of labour
between the state and the private sector under the overall guidance of a
super-ministry or state agency (state-informed public-private
partnership).
Edigheji also highlights the different versions of developmental states
according to developmental theorists and scholars. As he points out,
while some scholars adopt a strong statist interpretation of the
developmental state, emphasising the importance of the state governing
the market, others prefer a model based on consensus-building and
complementarity between the state and the private sector (Edigheji 2003:
3-8). Thus the debate has sometimes shifted from searching for a
functional model of development in Africa to debating successful models
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of development elsewhere, without even agreement on the description
of such models and the reasons behind their success.
To sum up, African scholars tend to support a leading role for the
state in the development process, even while criticising the predatory,
elitist and repressive features of the current African state. Some support
the reinvention of the African state to make it both developmental and
democratic. Some recognise that it is not only the role of the state that is
decisive in the development process but also its capacity. This depends
on strong and effective state institutions with autonomy from special
interests that would exploit the state for self-enrichment. One needs
also to admit that the state is no longer the sole development actor in
African countries. Accordingly a clear division of labour between the
three main development actors is needed.
Development Initiatives before NEPAD: A Critical Review
If the elements of state capacity, autonomy and partnership with
development actors are indeed central to African development, to what
extent have these elements been addressed in African development plans
from the Lagos Plan of Action up to NEPAD? A review of African
development plans before NEPAD reveals that there were significant
gaps in dealing with these elements. When the African development
predicament emerged at the end of the seventies and the beginning of
the eighties, African governments responded with the Lagos Plan of Action
(LPA). As a product of its historical moment the LPA reflected the African
development thought of that time, with its emphasis on collective self-
reliance and state-led development. In this view the state was the leading
actor and should bear the burden of elaborating the social, economic
and cultural policies that enable the mobilisation of the resources and
capabilities of the country. The LPA also emphasised the role of the
state in the fair distribution of both development burdens and benefits.
Although it did not explicitly discuss the role of the state in development,
the LPA made it clear that the state was both part of the development
crisis and the main agent for its resolution. The strategies that had been
adopted by African states were, according to the LPA, mainly responsible
for the crisis.
Although the LPA provided for African integration, it did not
adequately address the crucial elements for African development discussed
above, namely, capacity, autonomy and partnership. While concentrating
on sectoral programmes, the Lagos plan did not adopt a detailed strategy
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for building the capacity of domestic institutions in African countries.
The plan also dealt with the African development predicament as a mainly,
if not purely, economic crisis; corruption and clientalism were not major
concerns. Thus it was not only the lack of external support that led to
the less than successful implementation of the LPA but also the internal
flaws of the plan itself.
 The United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic
Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD) adopted by the twenty-first
Ordinary Summit of the OAU in July 1985 avoided some of the LPA’s
shortcomings. It emphasised the central role of the state in the
development process but added the need for building the capacity of
state institutions to enable it to perform this role. UNPAAERD also
asserted the importance of the private sector, but confined itself to stating
that ‘[t]he positive role of the private sector is also to be encouraged
through well-defined and consistent policies’ (Art. 11ei). At the end of
the 1980s the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) proposed the African Alternative Framework to Structural
Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP), one of whose main arguments was
to debunk the SAPs’ promotion of a minimal role for the state. It argued
that privatisation was failing due to the lack of an efficient, robust private
sector in most African countries and the resulting danger of domination
of African economies by foreign capital. Four imperatives needed to be
applied, the framework stated, to the path of adjustment: strengthening
and diversifying Africa’s production capacity, improving the levels and
distribution of people’s incomes, adjusting public expenditure to meet
people’s essential needs and providing institutional support for adjustment
with transformation. While many African scholars celebrated AAF-SAP
for its critique of SAPs and its attempt to elaborate an alternative plan
based on mobilising national resources and supporting regional
integration, others did not regard it as a real alternative framework and
criticised it as state-centered. In response Adebayo Adedeji, then General
Secretary of the UNECA and the main architect of AAF-SAP, argued
that it proposed a balanced non-ideological vision that neither called for
wholesale state intervention nor promoted total reliance on markets
(Onimode 1995: 138-140).
AAF-SAP’s attempt to develop an alternative framework to SAPs
was complemented by the Arusha Conference on Popular Participation
in Development in 1990, which adopted the African Charter for Popular
Participation in Development and Transformation. The charter introduced
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the idea of partnership between the state and civil society for promoting
development based on popular participation. According to the charter
civil society organisations can and should mobilise the African masses to
effectively participate in negotiating and debating development policies,
while also serve as an oversight tool to review the extent to which the
state is committed to implementing its development policies (Economic
Commission for Africa 1990). The charter proposed establishing a
dialogue forum between state and civil society organisations in every
African country to institutionalise this partnership (Economic
Commission for Africa 1990). Given the ambitious populist strategy of
the African charter, it was little wonder that it was enthusiastically
welcomed by African civil society organisations. However the charter
fatally lacked an implementation mechanism, and as a result this idealistic
plan went nowhere.
To sum up, the African development plans of the eighties and nineties
concentrated on establishing an alternative development strategy to SAPs,
a strategy in which the state would play a central role in the development
process. Some of these plans realised that there had to be reform of
public management systems and capacity building for state institutions,
while others relied on a partnership between the state and civil society
to achieve a people-centered model of development. However these plans
were sceptical about the role of the private sector; while admitting a
private-sector role theoretically and claiming to want to encourage this
role, no action plans were adopted to achieve the integration of the private
sector in African development strategies.
NEPAD and African Development: Partnership and Division of Labour
The ideological orientation of NEPAD, and its perspective on the role
of the state in the development process, cannot be understood without
considering the shift in thinking that has taken place in the neo-liberal
institutions, especially the World Bank, in recent years. During the 1970s
and 1980s these institutions demonized state intervention in the economy,
but by the late 1990s they began to admit that the state had a role to
play and that its capacity to do so needed to be enhanced. This change
came from inside the neo-liberal institutions themselves. At the World
Bank, Joseph Stiglitz led the move away from the “Washington consen-
sus”, with its rejection of state intervention, when he criticised neo-lib-
eral theory for not recognising the important role of the state in enhanc-
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ing human capital and promoting development. What Stiglitz proposed
was a mode of partnership between the state, the private sector and civil
society. For him an effective development strategy ‘must include compo-
nents aimed at developing the private sector, the state (the public sec-
tor), the community, the family, and the individual’ (Stiglitz 1998:24;
see also Onis and Senses 2003).
This self-critique was a result of various factors, but the most
prominent was the failure of SAPs in Africa compared to the “economic
miracle” that took place during the same period in several East-Asian
countries in which the state played an important role. A significant
landmark in the changing neo-liberal thinking was the 1997 World
Development Report, (World Bank 1997: 6) which noted that the most
successful modern development models were ones in which the state
balanced the role of markets in order to correct market failures and
maintain social justice:
Reducing or diluting the state’s role cannot be the end of the reform
story. Even with more selectivity and greater reliance on the citizenry
and on private firms, meeting a broad range of collective needs more
effectively will still mean making the state’s central institutions work
better. For human welfare to be advanced, the state’s capability —
defined as the ability to undertake and promote collective actions efficiently
— must be increased. This basic message translates into a two-part
strategy to make every state a more credible, effective partner in its
country’s development: Matching the state’s role to its capability and
raising state capability by reinvigorating public institutions. This means
designing effective rules and restraints to check arbitrary state actions
and combat entrenched corruption. It means subjecting state
institutions to greater competition to increase their efficiency. It means
increasing the performance of state institutions, improving pay and
incentives. And it means making the state more responsive to people’s
needs, bringing government closer to the people through broader
participation and decentralization. Thus, the Report not only directs
attention to refocusing the state’s role, but also shows how countries
might begin a process of rebuilding the state’s capability.
A similar orientation was proposed by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has promoted the logic
of public-private partnerships. This requires trust-building between the
state and the private sector so that their relations can be based on
complementarity instead of competition, with the aim of building an
institutional framework for the development process that does not hinder
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the role of the market and at the same time does not ignore the social
aspects of development (OECD 2003).
However these examples do not necessarily mean that a dramatic
shift is underway  in neo-liberal theory. As Erma Mawdsley and Jonathan
Rigg concluded after reviewing World Development Reports from the
late 1970s through to 2002, ‘the substantial shift towards more
participatory language and approaches, while welcome, is still
underpinned by utilitarian values, in which a depoliticized version of
“empowerment” is valued primarily for its contribution to the main goal
of economic growth’ (Mawdsley and Rigg 2003). Nevertheless  the
emerging post-Washington consensus indicates the demise of the state-
market dichotomy and the rise of a debate that is not concerned with
state intervention per se but with the form and extent of that intervention
and with building the capacity of the state to match its development
tasks .
Returning to NEPAD, many analysts and commentators share the
view that its ideological orientation is based on the neo-liberal mode of
development (Tandon 2002; Arthur 2003). However this orientation
reflects the post-Washinton consensus; it does not explicitly aim at eroding
the role of the state, as claimed by some African analysts, but instead
advocates a partnership between state, market and civil society, with the
main emphasis on the first two actors. NEPAD’s language concerning
the roles of the state and the market represents a compromise between
the language of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery
Programme (MAP), which emphasised the role of the state and the
importance of building the capacity of its institutions (Department of
Trade and Industry 2001) and that of UNECA’s Compact for African
Recovery, which praised the role of the private sector and advocated a
healthy private sector as a solution for Africa’s economic predicament
(Economic Commission for Africa 2001). These two documents, with
the addition of the OMEGA plan, were the main sources of NEPAD’s
thinking.
The compromise language of NEPAD is clear throughout the
document. While it praises the neo-liberal development model and argues
that the increasing commitment of African states to market-oriented
economies is a sign of hope and progress (NEPAD 2001: par. 7), it also
notes that the role and capacity of the state are matters of concern.
According to the document, ‘the weak state remains a major constraint
on sustainable development in a number of countries. Indeed, one of
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Africa’s major challenges is to strengthen the capacity to govern and to
develop long-term policies’ (NEPAD 2001: par. 23). Accordingly
capacity-building for state institutions is given a high priority, at least
theoretically, in the initiative:
State capacity-building is a critical aspect of creating conditions for
development. The state has a major role to play in promoting economic
growth and development, and in implementing poverty reduction
programmes. However the reality is that many governments lack the
capacity to fulfill this role. As a consequence many countries lack the
necessary policy and regulatory frameworks for private sector-led growth.
They also lack the capacity to implement programmes, even when funding
is available. It is for this reason that targeted capacity-building should
be given high priority. Programmes in every area should be preceded by
an assessment of capacity, followed by the provision of appropriate
support (NEPAD 2001: par 86-87).
In line with this some practical steps have been taken to build the
capacity of African institutions, one of which was the fourth Pan-African
Conference of Ministers of Public Service, held in May 2003, which
adopted a Programme on Governance and Public Administration aimed
at ensuring that African governments have the capacity to govern
effectively and deliver public goods (NEPAD 2002: 73). It is also now
an official objective of NEPAD to establish a technical unit in each African
country, administered by African experts rather than experts from
international financial institutions,  to help build institutional capacity
in all state institutions .
The question remains, what will be the actual impact of such initiatives
on the capacity of African institutions? Is NEPAD already beginning to
lose momentum and interest among African analysts and, more
importantly, among the African people? While hundreds of papers have
been written on NEPAD, very few are concerned with the implementation
steps needed to esnure state capacity-building. There is a danger that
NEPAD may gradually drift into being little more than a series of routine
meetings and celebrative gatherings that accomplish little and do not
attract the attention of many.
Regarding the issue of state-private sector partnership, some practical
steps have been taken. NEPAD is clear in urging ‘dialogue between the
government and the private sector to develop a shared vision of economic
development strategy and remove constraints on private sector
development’ (NEPAD 2001: par. 164). In this spirit the NEPAD
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Business Group (NBG) for Africa was created on the margins of the
International Conference on Financing for Development in March 2002
in Monterrey, Mexico. The NBG has undertaken a number of initiatives
that are currently at different stages of implementation, including the
Investment Climate Facility for Africa, the development of a Small
Medium Micro Enterprises (SMME) Strategy for Africa and the Seal of
Good Corporate Governance (NEPAD 2003/2004: 40-41).
Other national NEPAD business initiatives have been formed. In
South Africa the NEPAD Business Group has developed four
“covenants”, namely, Corporate Governance, Corporate Social
Responsibility, Elimination of Corruption and Bribery and Accounting
and Auditing Practices (NEPAD 2002: 67). NBGs in Lesotho, Nigeria
and Kenya have recently followed suit (NEPAD 2003/2004: 41).
The Role of Civil Society in Public-Private Partnerships
While the partnership between the state and the private sector, and
the initiatives taken to promote the role of the latter, have received a lot
of attention, both rhetorically and practically, in the last four years, the
question of the role of civil society has not attracted the same level of
concern. Those documents that discuss the role of civil society tend to
put emphasis on the integration of the sector in the NEPAD process as
a channel for popular participation rather than on civil society’s potential
as a partner in development. Thus, as a way of approaching civil society
activists and addressing criticism over the lack of popular participation,
the NEPAD Secretariat has held a number of conferences to promote
the involvement of community-based organisations (CBOs) in NEPAD
implementation. However true partnership between the state and civil
society needs to establish a dialogue between the two actors for discussing
development policies and priorities and specifying the developmental
role that civil society, especially CBOs, can play in meeting the needs of
local communities.
Some partial initiatives have been taken to address this issue. One
example is the cooperation between the NEPAD Secretariat and the
International Fund for Agriculture Development to support to promote
the participation of farmers’ associations in policy formulation for
increased productivity and enhanced market access. Nevertheless
NEPAD’s vision in regard to civil society participation in development
remains less ambitious than  previous initiatives, especially those related
to the African Charter for Popular participation in Development.
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The African Peer Review Mechanism and the Sharing of Best Devel-
opment Practices
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has the potential to
be an effective mechanism for sharing best practices in the relationship
between government, business and civil society. However the debate over
the APRM has so far focused on issues such as sovereignty, African
solidarity vs. peer pressure to promote good governance, punitive vs.
non-punitive actions in dealing with non-compliance and big states vs.
weak states (Cilliers 2002, 2003; Akokpari 2003; Tawfik and Kajee
2005). Little attention has been given to the potential of the APRM in
highlighting the laws, institutions and practices that need to be reformed
to develop a better climate for both public-private partnerships (Farlam
2005), although a central connotation of “peer review”, as derived from
the OECD, is the sharing of best practices.
It is against this background that the South African Institute of
International Affairs (SAIIA) conducted a study on public-private
partnerships to assess some African experiences in that regard. Their
assessment shows that the most successful partnerships have been
characterised by thorough planning, good communication, strong
commitment from both parties and effective monitoring, regulation and
enforcement by government. The study also shows that governments
need appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks to build capacity at
various levels to plan, draft, implement and monitor successful
partnerships. However it was noted that no single judgment can be made
on public-private partnerships; under the right conditions, and in the
right sectors, PPPs can offer value for money to governments and good
opportunities for investors, but governments need to undertake thorough
feasibility studies, develop appropriate and rigorous regulatory
frameworks, tackle corruption and demonstrate strong political
commitment (Farlam 2005: 43-65).
Conclusion
Towards a New Partnership between Development Actors in Africa
NEPAD, like previous African development initiatives, has its short-
comings, but it also opens up new opportunities for creating a balanced
relationship between the state and the market, promoting the capacity
of state and civil society institutions and increasing the autonomy of the
state by combating corruption and curbing the domination of special
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interests. On the other hand the initiative depends heavily on foreign
capital for its implementation, and it does not say how it will match
people-centered development with private sector-led growth (Anangwe
2002). While some African scholars strive to defend the role of the state
in Africa against the market fundamentalism of the “Washington-con-
sensus” paradigm, others have recognised that the way out of the Afri-
can economic predicament is to be found in some form of market-friendly
state interventionism (Kamdiza, Maltosa and Mwanza 2004). A devel-
opment paradigm that depends only on the state only is not adequate
for socio-economic development, but depending totally on the market
cannot maintain a fair distribution of resources or help fight poverty.
One can also argue that what Africa needs is not just a market-friendly
state interventionism but also a society-friendly private sector. Balancing
the two models requires governments to fight corruption, ensure trans-
parency and develop technical expertise to negotiate the terms of coop-
eration with the private sector and the private sector to act with social
responsibility and play its role in African renewal. In the light of this
equation there is no contradiction between the traits of an active devel-
opmental state, namely capacity and autonomy as underlined by
Mkandawire, and partnership between the state and the private sector.
Achieving this balance will not be an easy task. For much of the last
half-century mistrust has characterised the relationship between the state
and the private sector and between the private sector and the society.
NEPAD is not a complete answer to this problem, as it does not offer a
comprehensive, detailed paradigm that benefits from the role of the
private sector, takes the social aspects of development into consideration
and ensures international support. However some theoretical aspects of
the initiative can be elaborated to form the basis of such a paradigm.
While NEPAD emphasises the role of the private sector, it does not
ignore the need to build state capacity. The challenge remains one of
implementation, especially at a time when NEPAD may have began to
lose momentum. African scholars should move to the next step by
specifying what NEPAD needs to do and how the initiative can be applied
in every African state .
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